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NOTE
NOT THE LAST DANCE:
ASTAIRE V. BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP. PROVES
CALIFORNIA RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STATUTES AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT CAN CO-EXIST
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a comprehensive American history textbook excluding all
accounts of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. What about a
documentary chronicling baseball with no mention of Babe Ruth? The
achievements of these and other famous people have formed the contours
of American culture. Famous individuals are a common point of reference
for millions of Americans who never interact with one another, but share
common experiences through a media-saturated culture. Because of our
familiarity with their achievements, we expect the opportunity to embrace,
discuss, and appreciate the accomplishments of these well-known
individuals, and the law affords us the opportunity to do so by allowing
their stories, as well as images of their familiar
characteristics, to be used
2
in informational and entertaining works.
Fred Astaire, known as the "American god of dance," 3 was one such
famous individual. His fans remain as devoted to his work today as they
were in the 1930s. 4 Recently, film footage of the late dancer was used by a
producer of instructional videotapes sold under the title Fred Astaire
Dance Studios Presents How to Dance Series. The videotapes used the
footage of Astaire to demonstrate traditional styles
of dance made famous
5
by Astaire in his numerous film performances.

1. JOHN B. THOMPSON, IDEOLOGY AND MODERN CULTURE: CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY IN
THE ERA OF MASS COMMUNICATION 163 (1990).

2. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (noting that both
news and entertainment enjoy First Amendment protection).
3. Irene Lacher, Managingthe Memories, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at F8.
4. Id.
5. Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied,
98 DAILY JOURNAL D.A.R. 1679 (Feb. 19, 1998). See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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Fred Astaire's widow ("Mrs. Astaire") brought a lawsuit against the
producer of the videotapes, Best Film & Video Corp. ("Best Film"),
alleging that the film clips were not part of an informational or
entertaining work, but instead were a product advertisement used to market
the videotapes.6 Thus, she argued the use of the film footage violated her
right to control the commercial use of her late husband's persona
under
7
California's right of publicity statute for deceased personalities.
The right of publicity generally includes an individual's right to
profit from the value of his or her name, image, likeness, and other forms
of identity. This right protects an individual from the unauthorized and
unremunerated appropriation of these qualities by others. 9 California
statutory law Provides publicity rights for both living persons and deceased
personalities.
In Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp.,"1 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit interpreted California's right of publicity statute
concerning deceased celebrities in a way that allowed Best Film to use the
film footage of Astaire under a statutory exemption for uses in film and
television programs. 12 The court held that such an exemption shielding

6. Id. at 1298.

7. Id. California's right of publicity statute for deceased personalities states that
"Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods,
or for purpose[s] of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of products,

merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent from the person or persons
specified in subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages .... "

CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(a) (West 1998).

Under subdivision (c), the consent required by

subdivision (a) is exercisable by the person to whom the right of consent has been transferred.
Id. § 990 (c). According to the Ninth Circuit, these rights had been transferred to Mrs. Astaire.
Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299.
8. See, e.g., RESTATEwENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-50 (1995).

9. Id.
10. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (providing protection for living persons);
CAL. Civ. CODE § 990 (protection for deceased personalities). Section 990 defines "deceased
personality" as "any natural person whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has
commercial value at the time of his or her death ....
Id. § 990(h). The heirs of the deceased
may enforce the deceased personality's publicity rights under section 990. See id. § 990(b).
Currently, a total of 25 states protect the right of publicity either by common law or by
statute. See J. THOMAs McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6.1 [B], at 6-7
(1995). The right is recognized by statute in 14 states and by common law in the other 11. Id.
Some jurisdictions allow the right to be assigned and inherited. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
540.08 (West 1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 1984).
11. 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 98 DAILY JOURNAL D.A.R. 1679 (Feb. 19,
1998).

12. Id. at 1301-02.
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Best Film's use comported
with the purpose of California's right of
3
statutes.'
publicity

Prior to Astaire, the Ninth Circuit was notorious in its penchant for
granting celebrities expansive publicity rights under California common
law.14 In fact, the Ninth Circuit was dubbed the "Hollywood Circuit" for
its numerous decisions favorable to celebrities.' 5 For example, in White v.
Samsung ElectronicsAmerica, Inc., 16 the Ninth Circuit extended the right
of publicity to protect an individual from the unauthorized evocation of his
or her "identity."' 17 Such protection is much broader than the original
protection provided by California common
law, which extended only to
8
uses of an individual's name or likeness.'
Arguably, such an expansive interpretation of the right of publicity
grants celebrities a much broader monopoly over the control of
commercial uses of their persona than necessary to adequately safeguard
their economic value. 19 More importantly, such a broad view of the
publicity right may conflict with the First Amendment's core values, such
13. Id. at 1303.
14. The California common law right of publicity may be pleaded by alleging: (1) the
defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of the plaintiff's name or
likeness to defendant's advantage, commercial or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4)
resulting harm. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804-07 (4th ed. 1971)). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted
the second prong broadly, allowing celebrities to succeed on claims based on the appropriation
of their identities beyond name and likeness. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993) (holding that the evocation of identity
gives rise to a right of publicity claim at common law); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that imitation of a celebrity's voice gives rise to a right of publicity
claim at common law); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub
nom., Young & Rubicam, Inc. v. Midler, 503 U.S. 951 (1992) (holding that imitation of voice
gives rise to a right of publicity claim at common law); see discussion infra Part IV.
15. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989
F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski noted that the Ninth
Circuit has interpreted common law broadly, protecting more than celebrities' identity. Id. at
1515 (citing Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)). He argues that by protecting the evocation of Vanna White's
identity, the Ninth Circuit has created a new publicity right at common law. Id. at 1515. The
expansion of celebrities' publicity rights at common law has replaced the existing balance
between the interests of the celebrity and the public with a new balance more favorable to the
celebrity. Id.
16. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
17. Id. at 1399.
18. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 455 (Cal. 1979).
19. See Fred M. Weiler, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case for Privileged
Appropriation of Identity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 227 (1994). In this Note, the
term "persona" refers to any attribute protectable under the right of publicity. These attributes
include name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 990(a) (West
1998).
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as fostering a marketplace of ideas where knowledge and truth can be
freely disseminated. 20 Expansion of the right may also stifle cultural
discourse related to the contributions and perceptions of these famous
individuals. Indeed, a finding for Mrs. Astaire would have expanded the
scope of California's statutory right of publicity and, thus, hindered
producers of informational or entertainment related projects from using the
images of deceased celebrities out of fear of infringing their publicity
22
rights.
This Note focuses on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Astaire denying
right of publicity protection to the film footage in Best Film's instructional
videotapes. It contrasts the Astaire decision with the Ninth Circuit's prior
decisions granting broad protection to celebrities under California common
law. This Note argues that, although seemingly inconsistent with the
recent practice of the Ninth Circuit, the Astaire decision appropriately
resolved the conflict between the right of publicity and the First
Amendment in this decision based entirely on California statutory law. 23
Part II discusses the background, policies, and limitations of
California's right of publicity statutes. The discussion primarily focuses
on California Civil Code section 990, the right of publicity statute for
deceased persons. Part III discusses the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Astaire, arguing that the court properly interpreted section 990, applying it
in a manner consistent with the interpretations of other courts.
Part III
also argues the Ninth Circuit's decision properly balances California's
statutory right of publicity with the First Amendment without displacing
any First Amendment rights. Finally, Part IV explains the significance of
Astaire in light of the Ninth Circuit's recent decisions concerning the right
20. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970)

(identifying four premises upon which freedom of expression rests: individual self-fulfillment,
participation in decision-making by society, advancing truth and knowledge, and maintaining
stability in the community) ("An individual who seeks knowledge and truth must hear all sides
of the question, consider all alternatives, test his judgment by exposing it to opposition, and
make full use of different minds.").
21. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 239 (1993) (suggesting that the right of publicity
constricts the "cultural commons, freely available for use in the creation of new cultural
meanings and social identities...").
22. "Industry Won" In FredAstaire Decision-Best, VIDEO WK., June 30, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 7922200.
23. Although this Note argues that the case helped resolve the conflict between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly base its decision on the
First Amendment. In fact, the Ninth Circuit was able to resolve the case entirely on the basis of
section 990 of the California Civil Code. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1304. Thus, the Ninth Circuit did
not have to address the First Amendment concerns the case raised. Id.
24. See Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
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of publicity at common law. Part IV concludes that the ruling will
ultimately benefit the public because it provides wide latitude for
25 the
media.
various
in
persona
celebrity's
deceased
a
unauthorized use of
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY FOR THE DECEASED PERSONALITY:
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 990

A. Background
26

The right of publicity is not a fully developed legal doctrine.
Unlike copyright, trademark, and patent law, the right of publicity is not
mentioned in the United States Constitution, nor has it been federally
codified. 27 As a result, courts have had to rely almost entirely on state
common and statutory law when resolving right of publicity claims.2 8 The
United States Supreme Court gave states the ability to provide for a right
of publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co.,29 holding
that:
[Right of publicity] laws perhaps regard the "reward to the
owner [as] secondary consideration," but they were "intended
definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights" in order to
afford greater encouragement to the production of works of
benefit to the public. The Constitution does not prevent Ohio
from making a similar choice here in deciding to protect the
in order to encourage the production of
entertainer's incentive
30
this type of work.
In 1971, the California legislature enacted Civil Code section 3344,31
forbidding the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for
commercial purposes without his or her consent.32 In 1984, the California
25. See Daniel Terdiman, Instruction Video Not Infringing, 9th Circuit Rules, RECORDER,
June 23, 1997, at 1.
26. Kenneth E. Spahn, The Right of Publicity: A Matter of Privacy, Property,or Public
Domain?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1995).
27. Id.
28. Id,
29. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
30. Id. at 577 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
131, 158 (1948); Washington Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
31. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
32. Id. California adopted section 3344 in response to Dean Prosser's enunciation of the
four aspects of privacy. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979).
Prosser states the law of privacy is comprised of four causes of action, each consisting of a
distinct invasion by the defendant and a distinct interest of the plaintiff. William L. Prosser,
This fourth cause of action is for the
Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv 383, 389 (1960).
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legislature enacted section 990, a companion statute to section 3344,
establishing a post-mortem right of publicity. 33 The California Supreme
need for post-mortem publicity rights in Lugosi v.
Court recognized the
34
UniversalPictures.

In Lugosi, Bela Lugosi's heirs claimed Universal Pictures violated
Lugosi's publicity rights. Universal used Lugosi's likeness as Count
Dracula, a character he portrayed in the film Dracula, on consumer
products such as toy pencil sharpeners, beverage stirring rods, and candy
dispensers. 3 5 Under California's existing right of publicity statute, 36 the
court held that the right to exploit Lugosi's persona did not descend to his
heirs because Lugosi himself did not exploit his persona for commercial
gain during his lifetime. 37 The court viewed the right of publicity as a
privacy right, referring to it as a personal right that may be exploited only
by the artist during his lifetime. 39 Although the court was unwilling to
depart from California common law and hold publicity rights descendible
as property rights, it did suggest that the Legislature could amend section
3344 to recognize a "right of publicity action on behalf of the family or
Subsequently, the
immediate heirs of persons such as Lugosi. '93 9
California legislature enacted section 990.40
Comparing the language of section 990 to section 3344 reveals little
difference between the rights the statutes provide. 41 Both statutes prohibit
"[alppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness." Id.
33. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 990 (West 1998).
34. 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
35. Id. at 427-35.
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
37. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 428.
38. Id. at 429. While privacy rights are not descendible as "personal rights" that must be
recognized by the artist during his or her lifetime, the Lugosi court stated that property rights
relating to celebrity status could be inherited. For example, if Lugosi had established a business
under the name of "Lugosi Horror Pictures" and then assigned the property to his heirs, such a
right would be descendible. Id. at 428-31.
39. Id.at 430. Most likely, the holding in Lugosi would not have changed even if the
California Supreme Court had held that Lugosi's publicity rights were descendible. Lugosi
assigned the publicity rights surrounding his character to Universal Pictures in negotiations for
the film contract. Id. at 426 n.2.
40. CAL. Civ. CODE § 990 (West 1998) (effective May 25, 1988). One of the main features
of section 990 is that it protects the public image of the celebrity for fifty years after death.
Before the enactment of section 990, any right of publicity was deemed to end with the life of
the celebrity in California. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 431.
41. Compare CAL. Civ. CODE § 990(a) with CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a). Section 3344(a)
was amended at the same time to track the language of section 990(a). The only difference
between section 990(a) and section 3344(a) is that the latter requires a person to "knowingly"
use a person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness. Id. § 3344(a). Section 990(a)
§ 990. Perhaps, because section 990 specifically applies
does not have this requirement. See id.
to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, the

1998]

NOT THE LAST DANCE

the unauthorized use of an individual's name, voice, signature, photograph,
or likeness. Both statutes also exempt from liability uses of these personal
attributes related to any news, public affairs or sports broadcast, or any
political campaign. 42 Similarly, both provide that uses in a commercial
medium do not require consent simply because the material containing a
celebrity's persona is commercially sponsored or contains paid
The use of one's persona "directly connected" to a
advertising.
commercial sponsorship or paid advertising does, however, require
consent. 44 For example, a celebrity is "directly connected" to a

commercial sponsorship when his or her persona is appropriated to
endorse a particular product. 45 Ultimately, the only significant distinction
between the two statutes is that section 990 contains a clause expressly
permitting the use of a deceased celebrity's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness in a play, book, maazine, newspaper, musical
composition, film, radio or television program.
In contrast to sections 990 and 3344, the right of publicity is not
descendible under California common law.4 7 However, the right of
publicity at common law has been interpreted to protect a person's
"identity," providing more extensive coverage than the "name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness" protection found in section 990.48
drafters presumed users would know when they are using a celebrity's persona.
42. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 990(n), 3344(d) (West 1997).
43. Id. § 990(k); see also id. § 3344(e) (referring to a commercial medium as a medium
that is commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising).
44. Id. §§ 990(k), 3344(e).
45. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the use of a robot evoking the identity of Vanna White in an advertisement to sell video
cassette recorders was a product endorsement).
46. CAL. CrV. CODE § 990(n).
47. See Lugosi v. UniversalPictures, 603 P.2d 425, 429 (Cal. 1979).
48. For example, in Guglielmi v. Spelling-GoldbergProds., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979), the
California Supreme Court defined the right of publicity under common law as protecting
"against the unauthorized use of one's name, likeness or personality." Id. at 455 (emphasis
added). In Midler v. FordMotor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), the defendant hired a voice
impersonator to perform a famous Bette Midler song for a television commercial. Id. at 461.
The Ninth Circuit held when voice is a substantial indication of an identity, it is protected from
imitation for commercial purposes by the common law right of publicity. Id. at 463.
In White, the Ninth Circuit set forth the broadest pronouncement of the right of publicity
yet, that California's common law right of publicity protects the evocation of one's "identity."
White, 971 F.2d at 1398-99 ("The identities of the most popular celebrities are not only the most
attractive for advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such
as name, likeness, or voice."). In White, Samsung Electronics had created a print advertisement
featuring a robot in a gown and a blonde wig turning the letters of a game board resembling the
one from the television game show, Wheel of Fortune. Id. at 1396. Although Samsung did not
use the name or exact likeness of Wheel of Fortunehostess Vanna White, the court ruled that the
totality of the circumstances raised an inference that White's personality had been appropriated

402

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol.18

B. The Policies Behind the Right of Publicity
1. The Lockean Theory
Courts and commentators have offered three primary rationales for
the right of publicity.4 9 First, the Lockean labor theory justifies the grant
of a property right in one's person. 50 Under the Lockean theory, the fact
that celebrities have expended time and labor in developing commercially
identities entitles them to reap the financial rewards of their
valuable
51
labor.
The Lockean theory also supports a corollary policy related to the
right of publicity: the curtailment of unjust enrichment. 52 Advertisers and
merchandisers who appropriate a celebrity's persona without consent and
reap the resulting financial benefits for such use are unjustly enriched.5 3
By associating a celebrity with a product without his or her permission, the
advertiser or merchandiser can increase sales without paying the celebrity
for the use. 54
Aside from unjust enrichment, the advertiser or
merchandiser may implicate the doctrine of unfair competition.5 5 When
the celebrity's publicity value has been acquired at no cost, the advertiser

for commercial gain. Id. at 1399.
49. See Melvile B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
215-16 (1954). But see Madow, supra note 21, at 135, 178-238 (disputing all rationales behind
the right of publicity and questioning the soundness of the existence of the right).
50. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16-30 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed., 1952).
51. Weiler, supra note 19, at 240; see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S.
562, 576 (1977); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979).
52. The doctrine of unjust enrichment stands for the "[g]eneral principle that one person
should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at expense of another, but should be required
to make restitution of or for property or benefits received, retained or appropriated, where it is
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (5th ed.
just and equitable that such restitution be made ....
1979).
53. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) ("To impersonate her
voice [in this instance] is to pirate her identity."). The Ninth Circuit noted that the lower court
in Midler compared the defendant's conduct with that of the "average thief." Id. at 462.
54. Id.
55. Unfair competition is "dishonest or fraudulent rivalry in trade and commerce, but is
particularly applied to the practice of... substitut[ing] one's own goods or products in the
markets for those of another... by means of imitating or counterfeiting the name, title, size,
BLACK's LAW
shape, or other distinctive peculiarities of the article, or... package.
DICTIONARY 1371 (5th ed. 1979).
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or merchandiser competes unfairly with others who 56have paid substantial
sums of money to use the celebrity's identity legally.
However, the Lockean labor rationale invites criticism. Celebrity
status often bears no relation to talent or accomplishments. 57
It
in
public
involvement
luck,
coincidental
occasionally evolves out of
58
affairs, or criminal conduct.
The unjust enrichment argument supporting the right of publicity
may also be criticized. First, federal policy tends to favor the free use of
subject matter unprotected by intellectual property law, such as copyright
and trademark law.59 Second, the celebrity may have drawn upon the
labors of others in order to achieve his or her distinct persona.
Hence,
the Lockean labor theory supporting a return on the celebrity's investment
in developing a persona may 6be an insufficient justification for granting
celebrities a right of publicity. '
2. Economic Incentives
A second rationale behind the right of publicity is that protection of
the economic value in a celebrity's identity
encourages the celebrity to
62
engage in acts that enrich our culture.
Under this theory, the right of
publicity provides celebrities with the necessary motivation to stimulate
creative work by protecting their economic interests.
Accordingly,
celebrities will be less likely to perform if there is no guarantee they will
be able to reap the benefits.6 Critics point out, however, that individuals
are likely to seek celebrity status even without a right of publicity. 65 Thus,

56. Steven J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y

111, 118-19 (1981).

57. See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 341
n.220 (1988).
58. Id.
59. Weiler, supra note 19, at 242 (citing Compeo Corp. v. Day-Bright Lighting, Inc., 376

U.S. 234 (1964)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964)).
60. Id. at 243 (citing White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir.
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
61. Madow, supra note 21, at 179-81.

62. Id. at 178.
63. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 32-35 (4th ed. 1992). But see
Madow, supranote 21, at 209 (suggesting that even without the right of publicity, people would
pursue fame).
64. POSNER, supra note 63, at 32-35.
65. See Madow, supra note 21, at 209 (arguing that the right of publicity is not necessary
to assure an adequate supply of creative effort and achievement).
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like the Lockean labor rationale, the economic incentive rationale may be
an insufficient foundation upon which to base the right of publicity.6 6
3. Unfair Business Practices and Consumer Protection
A third rationale for the right of publicity relates to unfair business
practices and consumer protection. 67 Under this theory, the right of
publicity promotes the influx of accurate information about goods and
services to consumers protecting them from deception and related
marketplace harms.
Unauthorized use of a celebrity's likeness may
create a false impression that the celebrity actually endorses a particular
good or service, impairing the goodwill value to consumers of attaching a
celebrity's identity with a particular product. 69 By requiring authorization
of the celebrity, consumers are not deceived into thinking that a product is
endorsed by a celebrity when it actually is not.
In addition to consumer harm, this theory also recognizes that an
unauthorized use may disadvantage celebrities because it may inhibit their
ability to obtain other sponsorship opportunities, especially those with
competitors. 70
Unauthorized endorsements may also undermine a
celebrity's credibility and marketability, especially if the celebrity
becomes overexposed or if the product advertised is controversial.
Finally, this theory acknowledges that unauthorized appropriation
penalizes the sponsors who pay substantial sums for the use of a
celebrity's persona. 72 For example, if Company A uses the persona of a
celebrity without authorization and the celebrity has already authorized
Company B to use his image, Company B may be associated with
Company A because of the common use of the celebrity. If Company A is
controversial or has a bad reputation, Company B may, like the celebrity,
lose credibility.
Like the other policy justifications behind the right of publicity, the
unfair business practices and consumer protection rationale is subject to

66. Id. at 205.
67. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (prohibiting "false designations of origin" within
the commercial context).
68. Madow, supra note 21, at 235 (citing Douglas G. Baird, Note, Human Cannonballsand
the First Amendment: Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcastingCo., 30 STAN. L. REv. 1185,
1186 n.7 (1978)).
69. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970).
70. Spahn, supra note 26, at 1016.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1017.
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criticism. 73 Recent surveys suggest that the majority of adult television
gain
viewers believe that celebrities appear in advertisements for monet
In
product.
particular
endorse
a
they
truly
rather than to show that
addition, protecting consumers via the right of publicity is superfluous
because the federal Lanham Act 75 and equivalent state laws already exist
to prevent consumer confusion and deception. 76 Accordingly, the
justifications offered for the right of publicity and the criticisms of those
justifications reveal the inherent conflict within right of publicity law.77
C. Limitations on the Right of Publicity
There are constitutional limitations on the right of publicity. 78 The
First Amendment strives to protect free speech and creative expression in
order to promote the democratic exchange of ideas and to encourage
artistic contributions to society. 79 However, different types of speech are
afforded different levels of protection. The Supreme Court has held that
while entertainment, news, and political works are subject to full First
Amendment protection,8 0 purely commercial speech receives less First
Amendment protection. 8 Advertisers, or others who exploit a celebrity's
name or likeness for commercial gain, are entitled to less First Amendment
protection than someone who uses a celebrity's name or likeness for
73. Madow, supra note 21, at 229 n.478.
74. Id.
75. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1994)). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits the false designation of the origin, false
descriptions, and false representations in the advertising and sale of goods and services. 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a).
76. Madow, supra note 21, at 233-35.
77. CompareMCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 1.11 (stating that the right of publicity protects
the value of the celebrity's persona and prevents unwanted association with products) with
Madow, supra note 21, at 239 (suggesting that the right of publicity conflicts with our "cultural
commons," which are freely available for the use of new cultural meanings and identities).
Professor Madow contends that the criticisms of the rationales for a right of publicity suggest
that no right should exist at all. See Madow, supra note 21, at 239.
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... "). The First Amendment has been incorporated to apply to the
States through the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana,
392 U.S. 947 (1968).
79. See EMERSON, supra note 20, at 6; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 458-59 (Cal.
1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
80. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
81. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) ("The Constitution affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
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political or expressive speech. 82 Consequently, courts must weigh a
plaintiff's publicity rights against the First Amendment protection afforded
to a defendant's creative work. Thus, courts must carefully draw a
distinction between commercial, political, and expressive uses of a
celebrity's image.
This constitutional distinction is implied within California Civil Code
section 990, which states that any person who uses a deceased
personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness "for purposes
of advertisingor selling, or solicitingpurchases of products, merchandise,
goods, or services, without prior consent . . . shall be liable for any
' 3
damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. 8
Furthermore, an express exemption within section 990 precludes liability
for the use of a deceased celebrity's persona in: (1) a play, book,
magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, or radio or television
program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement for a
non-permitted use; (2) material that has political or newsworthy value; (3)
a single and original work of fine art; or (4) an advertisement or
commercial announcement for a permitted use indicated in (1)-(3). 4
Thus, use of a celebrity's persona in a work that is not an advertisement, or
is an advertisement of a permitted use, does not give rise to a violation of
the right of publicity under the statute.
III. ASTAIRE V. BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.

A. Background
In 1965, Fred Astaire granted the Ronby Corporation ("Ronby") an
exclusive license to use his name to promote the dance studios Ronby
operated.8 5 Astaire also granted Ronby the right to use certain pictures,
photographs, and other likenesses of himself that were the subject of a
previous agreement between the two. 86 Astaire agreed that Ronby could
use new photos and likenesses upon approval as well. 87 Twenty-four years
later, Best Film entered into an agreement with Ronby to produce a series
of instructional dance videotapes called the Fred Astaire Dance Studios

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(a) (West 1998) (emphasis added).
Id. § 990(n).
Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299.
Id.
Id.
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Presents How to Dance Series.88 The agreement permitted Best Film to
Ronby.
use the likenesses Astaire granted
The series features different styles of dance instruction, such as
swing, Latin, and ballroom dancing.90 The videos, which are each about

thirty minutes long, contain approximately ninety-three seconds of Fred
Astaire film footage demonstrating the dance styles, as well as still photos
however, is narrated and
of Astaire. 9 1 The actual dance instruction,
92
conducted by someone other than Astaire.
In 1989, Mrs. Astaire sued Best Film in federal court. 9 3 She alleged
Best Film violated her sole proprietor rights under section 990 because the
videotapes incorporated Fred Astaire's image without authorization. 94 The
District Court ruled in favor of Mrs. Astaire, finding that section 990 did
95
not exempt uses of a deceased celebrities' persona within videotape.
Best Film appealed the ruling, contending that the District Court erred in
finding that videotapes were not exempt under section 990.96 Mrs. Astaire
to find the film
appealed the portion of the court's holding declining 97
advertisement.
an
as
990
section
under
actionable
footage

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299. The film clips were taken from two films in which Astaire
performed, Second Chorus and Royal Wedding. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990(b), (d) (West 1998).
94. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299.
95. Id. at 1300. In addition, the court found Mrs. Astaire's section 990 claim was not
preempted by the federal Copyright Act, and Best Film's use of Astaire's persona was not
protected by the First Amendment. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Rather than holding Best Film liable because uses within videotape fall outside the
statutory exemption, the court could have held that Best Film's use was a product advertisement
violative of section 990. See CAL. Cirv. CODE § 990(a). Section 990(a) states that uses of a
deceased personality's persona for "the purposes of advertising or selling" a product are not
permitted unless the statutory exemption applies. Under the exemption, uses in various media
other than advertisements of the media in which the use is contained are exempt. See id. §§
990(a), (n). Mrs. Astaire did not appeal the holding, but rather the rationale, arguing that the
District Court should have found the use of the film clips within the videotapes was an
unpermitted advertisement. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1300.
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B. The Ninth CircuitRuling

The court first considered whether Best Film's use of the Astaire film
98
clips was free from liability pursuant to the section 990 exemption.
Applying California rules of law on statutory interpretation, 99 the court
found that the use was exempt from section 990 liability for two principal
reasons.100
First, the court held that the language of section 990 implies that
videotapes are encompassed within the exemption for film and television
programs.' 0 1 Although there is ordinarily "no need to resort to the indicia
of the intent of the legislature" when the language is clear, the court held
that it was not prohibited from determining whether a literal reading of the
statute complies with its purpose. 102 The court held that "[i]t is a settled
rule of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be
given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences
which the Legislature did not intend.', 10 3 Accordingly, the court stated that
exempting a film or television program without exempting a videotape
leads to an illogical result. 104 It does not make sense for a film to be
exempt when projected in the theater, but not a videotape of the same film
when rented from a video store.
Furthermore, the court argued that it would be inconsistent to
maintain a narrow definition of "film" and "television program," as
described in one part of section 990, when a "photograph" is defined
broadly as "any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving,
or any video tape or live television transmission, of any person, such that
98. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1300 (referring to section 990). If exempt, the other issues
raised-the First Amendment and federal preemption-would not have to be resolved. Id. at
1304.
99. Under California law, a statute is to be construed on the basis of the legislative intent
behind it. Id.(quoting Quintano v. Mercury Cas. Co., 906 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Cal. 1995)). In
determining such intent, courts must first look to the language of the statute and give each word
"its usual, ordinary import." Id. Courts must also consider whether the plain language of the
statute comports with the legislature's purpose for adopting the law. Id. at 1302. Legislative
purpose may be gleaned from the history of the statute, committee reports, and staff bill reports.

Id.
100. Id. at 1301-02.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1301 (citing Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 303-04 (Cal. 1988)).
103. Id. (quoting Younger v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 1014, 1021-22 (Cal. 1978)). The
Ninth Circuit emphasized that "intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be
read so to conform to the spirit of the act." Id. (quoting Lungren, 755 P.2d at 304).
104. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1301. Inclusion of a deceased celebrity's persona in a film or
television program is an exempted use. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(n) (West 1998).
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the deceased personality is readily identifiable."' 0 5 If the statutory
definition of "photograph" encompasses a videotape recording of a film,
the statutory definition of "film" should certainly encompass a
videotape.' 0 6 In light of the legislative purpose and the broad scope of
Court's decision, concluding
defined terms, the court reversed the District
10 7
the term "film" extended to videotape.
Second, the court held that the legislative intent behind section 990
supports the court's holding. Based on relevant legislative reports, the
court concluded that the exemption was meant to extend to uses beyond
"legitimate ' historical, fictional, and biographical accounts of deceased
celebrities. 108 An earlier version of the statute stated that a defendant's
First Amendment rights would not be derogated by right of publicity
claims. 109
The court believed that the omission of this language
demonstrated the Legislature's intent to adopt a broader exemption not
limited solely
to constitutionally protected uses in the adopted version of
0
the law."
Notwithstanding Mrs. Astaire's assertion that the use of the films
clips made the videos more marketable, the court held that "neither the
statute nor legislative history provides any support for treating Best Film's
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(i) (emphasis added).
106. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1301.
107. Id. at 1301-02.
108. Astaire, 116 F.3d. at 1304. The court quoted the original version of California Civil
Code section 990(n) which stated that nothing in section 990 "'shall be construed to derogate
any rights protected by constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the press..
• .' Id. at 1303. The court stated, however, that this language was later dropped to extend the
exemption beyond "constitutionally protected uses." Id. Next, the court discussed the real
legislative intent behind the statute: to address commercial gain through exploitation of a
deceased celebrity's right to publicity and to curtail abuse or ridicule to the celebrity in the form
of a marketed product. Id.
109. Id. at 1303 (citing S.B. 613, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1984) (as amended June 12,
1984)).
110. Id. In addition to the legislative intent extrapolated from the revised statutory
language, the Ninth Circuit cited two purposes behind the bill that proposed section 990. Id.
First, the bill was created to apply to situations where a celebrity's persona is exploited for
commercial gain in the marketing of goods or services. Id. Second, the bill was designed to
address circumstances where a celebrity is subject to abuse or ridicule in the form of a marketed
product. Id. Examples of such goods or products include the use of a celebrity's name or
likeness on T-shirts, collectibles, or other items. Id. Arguably, a videotape could be considered
such a good or product. When a celebrity's persona is incorporated into a videotape unrelated
to the celebrity, the videotape is more like a product than an expressive work with respect to the
celebrity's persona. Although the Ninth Circuit did not make such a distinction, it reached the
same result as if it had. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that Best Film's use of Astaire's persona in
the dance instructional videotapes were not the kind of goods the drafters of section 990
contemplated and they did not offend the purposes behind section 990 because the videotapes
did not subject Astaire to abuse or ridicule. Id.
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use of the Astaire film clips any differently from the use of the same clips
in a documentary about dance in film, a use that Mrs. Astaire concedes
The court held that the media in
would be exempt from liability."'
which most uses are embodied is of a commercial nature and that whether
a use increases the marketability of a product does not alone determine the
liability of a user.12
Once the court determined that videotapes were encompassed by
section 990, it considered whether the film footage itself constituted an
advertisement. The court held that it did not. 13 Only advertisements or
works (e.g., films, television programs, etc.) incorporating the persona of a
Despite its
deceased celebrity are permitted under section 990.
conclusion, the court believed that it was irrelevant whether the Astaire
film clips were considered an advertisement." 5 Even if the Astaire film
clips were an advertisement, the court rationalized, the clips would be an
advertisement of the videotape as a whole, including the film clips
themselves, rather than an advertisement for some other product." 6 Thus,
even as an advertisement, the film footage would be exempt under the
provision in section 990 shielding advertisements of works containing
permitted uses.117
C. Discussion of the Ninth Circuit'sAnalysis
Aside from the court's interpretation of California law, this case
implicates more significant First Amendment issues. On a number of
occasions the Ninth Circuit has refused to recognize the First Amendment
The line of pre-Astaire cases
as a limit on the right of publicity.

111. Id.
112. Id.; see CAL. CrV. CODE § 990(k) (West 1998) (stating that the use of a celebrity's
persona in a commercial medium shall not constitute a use that requires authorization solely
because the material containing the use is of a commercial nature); see also Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 459 (Cal. 1979) (stating that the First Amendment is
not limited to those who publish without charge). A work does not lose constitutional protection
if it is undertaken for profit. Id. at 460.
113. Astaire, 116 F.3d. at 1302.
114. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(n)(4).
115. Astaire, 116 F.3d. at 1302.
116. Id. The dissent disagreed with the majority's contention that the Astaire film clips
would be exempt even as an advertisement. Id. at 1304 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Judge
Schroeder argued that use of the Astaire film clips was not permitted under section 990 because
it was not related to the expressive dance instructional portion of the videotape. Id. As such, he
argued that the section 990 exemption for advertisements of permitted uses did not apply. Id.
117. Id. at 1302; see CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(n)(4).
118. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992); White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
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revealed the Ninth Circuit's willingness to expand the protection afforded
to a celebrity's identity by the right of publicity under California common
law.
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 1 9 the defendant hired a voice
impersonator to sing a famous Bette Midler song for a television
The court found that when a voice is a substantial
commercial.
indication of a celebrity's identity, the common law right of publicity
protects it from imitation for commercial purposes. 1 2 1 Similarly, in Waits
v. Frito-Lay,Inc., 122 use of Tom Waits' voice by an impersonator to sell
spot was considered a violation of his
Frito-Lay products
123 in a radio
publicity rights.
In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 124 the Ninth Circuit
declared for the first time that the right of publicity includes
"appropriations of identity," forbidding the unauthorized use of a
celebrity's attributes to the extent the celebrity may be identified. In this
than it or any other court
decision, the Ninth Circuit's holding went further
25
publicity.
of
right
the
protecting
in
had
ever
White has been heavily criticized as "subjective, expansive, and
unpredictable."' 126 Arguably, the decision covers all personal attributes
that may evoke the identity of a celebrity. 127 Unlike the statutes that
specify which uses may violate a person or deceased celebrity's publicity
Not only
rights, the practical scope of the White decision is limitless.
of personal attributes provide courts with excessive
does the protection
129
it also deters the creation of new cultural meaning and
discretion,0
identity.13 In addition, White has been criticized for granting the celebrity
1988).

119. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
120. Id. at 463.
121. Id.
122. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).

123. Id. at 1096.
124. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).

125. Lisa M. Gigliotti, Beyond Name and Likeness: Should California'sExpansion of the
Right of Publicity ProtectNon-Human Identity?, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 64, 64 (1993).
126. See Paul Cirino, Advertisers, Celebrities, and Publicity Rights in New York and
California,39 N.Y.L. SCH.L. REv. 763, 790 (1994).
127. White, 971 F.2d 1395, reh 'gdenied,989 F.2d at 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
128. Christopher Pesce, Note, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect
Against Imitation?, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 782, 799 (1990) ("Any distinctive attribute, habit, phrase,
or object associated with a celebrity could be eligible for protection against commercial

exploitation.").
129. ld
130. See Madow, supra note 21, at 239. The right of publicity gives a celebrity the power
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a common law monopoly much broader than is necessary to sufficiently
13 1
protect the economic value of a celebrity's identity,
one of the very
132
achieve.
to
attempts
publicity
of
right
policies the
In the only Supreme Court case to address the right of publicity, it
too gave states wide latitude in providing for this type of economic
incentive. 133 The First Amendment, however, protects uses of an
individual's persona, whether in books, magazines, or film. When the use
of a famous person's protected attributes are sanctionable under state right
of publicity claims, the motivation to create such expressions is chilled.
California's right of publicity laws accommodate the broad goals of the
First Amendment by exempting expressive uses of persons, otherwise
protected attributes.! 34 In Astaire, the court furthered this goal by
extending the exemption to cover videotapes, a medium that is at least as
expressive as its film or print counterparts. Yet there are still many types
of uses not deserving of First Amendment protection. 3
1. Works Related to Entertainment
In Guglielmi, Rudolph Valentino's legal heir claimed a right of
publicity violation for the defendant's use of Valentino's name, likeness,
and personality in a fictionalized television production based on the actor's
life. The court held that such a use did not raise a right of publicity claim
because the film is subject to the constitutional protections of the First
36 The court
Amendment.1
distinguished
thedefendant
facts of this case from those in
137
Lugosi v. Universal
Pictures,
where the
used Lugosi's image
to suppress appropriations of his or her persona that depart from the meaning he or she prefers.
Id. at 145. It also gives the celebrity power to deny the use of his or her persona in the
construction of alternative identities, thus limiting the expressive opportunities of the public. Id.
at 146. The result is a narrowing of the channels of alternative cultural dialog. Id.
131. Weiler, supranote 19, at 227.
132. See discussion supra note 15.
133. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
134. In Zacchini, the Supreme Court declared the First Amendment protects both
information and entertainment. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578; see also Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (deeming informative and entertaining expression worthy of equal freespeech protection because the "line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for
the protection of the basic right"). The language in section 990(n) parallels this notion,
specifically stating that there is no liability when the use of a deceased celebrity's persona is
included in "[a] play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio, or
television program." CAL. C]V. CODE § 990 (n) (West 1998). Section 990 does not, however,
exempt uses that exploit a celebrity's persona for commercial gain or subject a celebrity to
abuse or ridicule in the form of a marketed product. Id. at 990(a).
135. See discussion infra Part III.C.l.c.
136. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 463-64 (Cal. 1979).
137. 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).

NOT THE LAST DANCE

1998]

as "Dracula" on commercial products, including candy dispensers and
beverage. stirring rods. 138 The Guglielmi court called these products
"objects" that, unlike motion pictures, "are not vehicles through which
ideas and opinions are regularly disseminated.' ' 139 Thus, the court
reasoned, such uses should not receive the same First Amendment
protection. 140
Similarly, in Joplin Enterprises v. Allen, 14 1 the court held that the
Janis Joplin did not violate her right
defendant's two-act play about sin
Unlike the videotapes at issue in
of publicity under section 990.
Astaire, the play at issue in Joplin was expressly encompassed within the
incorporation of Joplin's likeness
section 990's exemption. 143 Therefore,
144
into the play was not actionable.
Arguably, the Astaire film clips are not a part of the expressive
nature of the videotapes because they were not used as a part of the actual
dance lesson. 145 Justice Schroeder stated in his dissent that the Astaire
film clips should not be exempt under section 990 because they were
attached "to the dance instruction video in the form of a prefatory
announcement" rather than included as a part of the dance lesson. This
rationale, however, is illogical. Had Best Film inserted the clips into the
middle of the lesson, that use of the clips would likely have been exempt.
Moreover, calling the Astaire film clips an advertisement to begin
with seems unfounded. The viewer would not see the Astaire film clips
until after the videotape was purchased. Thus, there is really no need for
Best Film to use the clips as an advertisement once the sale has been made.
The fact that Astaire's name was on the packaging of the box may have
advertised 1or
endorsed the videotapes, but this use of his name was
46
authorized.

The videotapes in Astaire are more comparable to the protected
forms of expression in Guglielmi and Joplin than to the candy dispensers
and beverage stirrers in Lugosi because the videotapes are more than
consumer goods. Similar to a fictionalized film or play, the material on
138. Id. at 435.

139. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 463.
140. Id.at 464.
141. 795 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.at 351.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(n)(1) (West 1998).
Joplin, 795 F. Supp. at 351.
Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299. The film clips preceded the dance instructional portion of

the videotape.
146. Id. Mrs. Astaire and Best Film agree that Best Film's use of Astaire's name is
authorized under Astaire's agreement with Ronby. Id.
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the videotapes is the expression 47of an idea that possesses both
entertainment and educational value.'
As set forth in Guglielmi, entertaining works, such as the
fictionalized film about Valentino's life, are entitled to the same
constitutional protection as the exposition of information for two
reasons. 18 First, the line between information and entertainment is too
elusive to separate: what one person finds amusing may be educational to
another. 149 Second, entertainment, as a mode of self-expression, warrants
constitutional protection regardless of its contribution to the market-place
1 51
of ideas. 5 0° Self-expression is necessary for the development of ideas.
Works of fiction express "commentaries on our values, habits, customs,
laws, prejudices, justice, heritage and future." 152 In addition, what may be
difficult to communicate when factually reported
may be conveyed
153
powerfully if offered in parody or science fiction.
2. Works Related to Education and Information
In addition to being a creative and entertaining work under section
990, the instructional videotapes are a source of educational information
warranting First Amendment protection as well.' 54 The First Amendment
protects use of a celebrity's persona within an educational work if the use
is reasonably related to the content of the expression. 15 Using a name or
photograph in a textbook to convey an idea associated with a particular
celebrity is an effective educational method because the celebrity can be
identified with easily. 156 Known people active in the fields of "politics,
economics, sciences, and the arts" should expect their personas to be used
147. In order to receive copyright protection, the dance instruction videotape would have
to be considered an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 17
U.S.C. § 102 (1994). While illustration of specific dance steps may be considered a noncopyrightable idea, the selection, arrangement, or coordination of the film clips, still
photographs, narrator's introduction, and instructional portion of the video may be considered a
copyrightable compilation. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
148. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d at 459 (1979).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.(citing EMERSON, supra note 20, at 879).
153. Id.
154. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 8.8[B][3], at 8-49 ("If information on 'public
issues' is within the core of strong first amendment protection and immune from appropriation
privacy and Right of Publicity liability, then educational and scholarly uses of a person's
identity clearly must also be immune.").
155. See id.
156. See id.
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"without payment to illustrate the content ' 57
of books, articles, and films
fields."'
those
upon
comment
or
which teach
Because Fred Astaire is so well known for his dancing, film clips of
are reasonably related to a dance instruction, videotape
performances
his
featuring traditional styles of dance.15 8 Use of his image serves as an
inspiration to viewers eager to follow the instruction and as a reminder of
the history of popular dance. Furthermore, Astaire and his estate should
have anticipated that his persona would be used without payment in media
that teaches or comments upon dancing because Astaire was such a wellknown performer.' 59 In fact, Astaire did desire his image to be associated
with the dance world, evidenced by the exclusive license he granted to
Ronby to60 use his name in association with the operation of their dance
studios.'
Moreover, a holding that the dance instruction video fell outside
statutory protection would stifle education and information. A producer
who wanted to create a made-for-video documentary would be required to
"buy" permission to include a clip of a well-known individual. Moreover,
such a ruling would not be limited to entertainers. Every newspaper and
textbook publisher would have to acquire permission from any historical
or political figure, such as past presidents, about whom the publisher
desired to write.
The court's second rationale for including videotapes within the
section 990 exemption was based purely on logic: it would be illogical 16to1
protect uses within a film, but not a videotaped reproduction of the film.
However, rather than focusing on the media in which a work exists,
determining whether the use of a celebrity's persona is contained within a
purely commercial 162 or an expressive work seems to be the more relevant
inquiry for determining if there is a section 990 violation. In spite of the
ambiguity, the court most likely intended the section 990 exemption to
extend to uses within any expressive work rather than to videotape simply

157. See id. In Guglielmi, concurring Chief Justice Rose Bird stated, "[P]rominence invites
creative comment. Surely, the range of free expression would be meaningfully reduced if
prominent persons in the present and recent past were forbidden topics for the imaginations of
authors of fiction." Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 460 (Cal. 1979).
158. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 8.8[B][3], at 8-48.
159. See id.
160. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299.
161. Id.

162. For purposes of this Note, a "purely commercial work" is one that lacks any
expression protected by the First Amendment. Although an expressive work may be of a
commercial nature, it may be entitled to First Amendment protection. See discussion supranote
112.
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because film can be transferred to it. 163 Section 990's exemption was
meant to illustrate examples of media that embody expressive works and,
thus, be exempt from right of publicity claims when such works
incorporate the image of a deceased personality. 164 The statute is
concerned with the way a deceased personality's image is used, not the
medium. 165 Extending coverage of section 990 to creative works in media,
other than those specifically listed, is consistent with the purpose of the
bill and allows the right of publicity and the First Amendment to coexist. 166
Under this approach, the relation between the use of the deceased
personality's persona and the expressive nature of the work must also be
considered. If the use of the persona is completely unrelated to the rest of
the work, then it is likely that a right of publicity claim exists. 167 In such a
case, an expressive work is analogous to a "product" for purposes of
section 990 because use of the
deceased personality's persona does not aid
168
in the expression of an idea.
Nevertheless, exempting uses in educational and entertaining works
based on the First Amendment provides the strongest, most well-grounded
argument for excluding use of the Astaire film clips from a right of
publicity claim.
The court, however, never discussed the First

163. The dissenting opinion states that the majority intended section 990's exemption to
apply to all "expressive works." Astaire, 116 F.3d. at 1304.
164. Because the purpose of section 990 was to prevent unauthorized commercial
exploitation of a deceased celebrity's persona, 116 F.3d at 1303, it hardly seems that the media
in which this takes place is of any importance.
165. Id.
166. Such an approach to distinguishing between protected and unprotected uses is
consistent with the First Amendment, which protects educational and entertaining works.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) Because the drafters of
section 990 deleted language in the original version of the statute, stating that First Amendment
rights would be protected, the Ninth Circuit found that section 990 protected more than the First
Amendment. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1303. Otherwise, there would be no need for the statute at
all. Mrs. Astaire, however, believed that section 990 only applied to "legitimate historical,
biographical, and fictional works." Id. at 1302. It should be noted that the protection provided
by the First Amendment and section 990 end in roughly the same place. Like section 990,
which does not protect uses incorporated into advertisements and commercial endorsements
unrelated to a permitted use, the First Amendment provides less protection to commercial
speech. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(n) (West 1998) with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
167. If the use of a celebrity's persona is not related to the content of the expression it is
likely that the celebrity's persona has been used solely to endorse the product. Such a use is not
permitted by section 990. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(a).
168. Section 990 protects the celebrity from uses of their persona in or on products, in
addition to uses in advertisements and for commercial purposes. Id.
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169
Amendment, resolving the case on section 990's language alone.
Grounding the decision on the First Amendment would have resulted in
the same just outcome in favor of Best Film.

3. Distinguishing Between a Protected and Unprotected Use
California case law pertaining to the right of publicity distinguishes
between uses of a celebrity's persona in a medium of expression protected
are not. 170
by the First Amendment and uses in a consumer product which
Unauthorized uses of a celebrity's persona on consumer products, such as
a plastic bust of Martin Luther King, Jr.17 1 or pencil sharpeners reflecting
the image of Bela Lugosi as "Dracula,"' 172 are subject to right of publicity
claims.
While the court determined that Best Film's instructional videotapes
were not exploitative, it did not articulate a rule defining when a use ispart
of a commercial product or when it is part of an expressive work. 17P If
forced to create a rule, perhaps the court would have said that such a
decision should be based upon the facilitation of public discourse.174 One
might argue that uses within works that benefit society should be protected
1 75
because access to information and ideas strengthens cultural dialogue.
The continuing privatization of the celebrity image exhibited by the
Ninth Circuit's pre-Astaire decisions diminishes the public's opportunity
to construct and circulate views on what the celebrity represents in
society. 176 Such a trend may have influenced the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Astaire and prompted it to treat section 990 differently when it could
have simply upheld the judgment of the District Court.
169. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1304 n.2.
170. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 463-64 (Cal. 1979). For the
purpose of this Note, the term "consumer products" refers to commercial products which are not
capable of disseminating ideas and opinions.
171. Martin Luther King, Jr., Cntr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
172. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
173. Astaire, 116 F.3d. at 1303.
174. See Sudakshina Sen, Comment, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of
Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV. 739, 753 (1995).
175. See Madow, supra note 21, at 239 ("[I]he law ought to align itself with cultural
pluralism and popular cultural production. It ought to expand, not contract, the space in which
'local' discourses and alternative cultural practices can develop."). The result would be a
"decentralized, open, 'democratic' culture practice" rather than a "centralized, top-down
management of popular culture" that exists with expansive protection of an individual's
publicity rights. Id.
176. See Sen, supra note 174, at 753 (citing JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236-39
(1987)).

418

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 18

Alternatively, maybe the line between a protected and an unprotected
use with respect to section 990 depends on the context of the use, rather
than merely whether the use is contained within an expressive or purely
commercial work. In her Guglielmi concurrence, Chief Justice Bird noted
that a cause of action might have existed had the defendant, instead of
producing a fictionalized movie about Rudolph Valentino, published a
"Rudolph Valentino Cookbook" containing recipes and menus completely
unrelated to Valentino. 177 Bird noted that as long as the use of a
celebrity's name is not wholly unrelated to a trait or activity for which the
celebrity is noted, the right of publicity does not apply. 17 Perhaps the
Ninth Circuit would have come to this same conclusion in Astaire if it had
considered the First Amendment argument.
In fact, if the Astaire film clips were used in a "how-to" video
unrelated to dancing, such as a "how-to" video about gardening, the court
might have found a right of publicity violation by deeming such a use
analogous to use in a commercial product lacking the requisite expressive
qualities. 179 Even a "how-to" video about break-dancing might be
considered unrelated to Fred Astaire because break-dancing is not a style
of dancing for which Astaire is known. 10 Thus, in deciding future section
990 cases, perhaps the Ninth Circuit will subjectively consider the intent of
the alleged infringer and query whether the defendant intended to sell an
expressive product or a product bearing no relation to the individual whose
image was used.
IV. CONCLUSION: SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ASTAIRE DECISION
The expansion of the right of publicity has raised concerns that First
Amendment values, such as "[the] free flow of ideas essential to energetic
81
public discourse and the exchange of cultural dialogue," are in jeopardy.'
177. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
178. Id.
179. One criticism of this argument is that "how-to" type videos are not expressive works
to begin with, but are more like products. This argument, though, is countered by the fact that
educational and informational works, such as books, designed to teach, receive First
Amendment protection. See discussion supra Part II.C.
180. The types of dance instruction videos produced by Best Film included Swing, Latin,
and Ballroom Dancing. Id. Astaire was known for each of these styles of dancing. See FLYING
DOWN TO RIO (RKO Pictures, Inc. 1933) (Astaire engaged in Latin dancing); SWING TIME (RKO
Pictures, Inc. 1936) (Astaire engaged in swing dancing); TOP HAT (RKO Pictures, Inc. 1935)
(Astaire engaged in ballroom dancing).
181. See Sen, supra note 174, at 752; see also JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 236-39
(1987) (defining "semiotic democracy" as a society in which all persons are able to participate
in the generation and circulation of cultural meanings) ("[T]he continuing privatization of the
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The Ninth Circuit has certainly done its part in expanding this right.
Astaire, however, reveals the Ninth Circuit's willingness to put a limit on
the boundaries of celebrities' publicity rights.
Just as the court expanded the qualities of the individual subject to
right of publicity claims in White, Waits, and Midler, it easily could have
found for Mrs. Astaire and ruled that Best Film's use of the Astaire film
clips was an advertisement for the videotapes in violation of section
990.182 Instead, the court defined the contours of the right of publicity
dance
under California statutory law,' 83 illustrating why the instructional
1 84
violation.
publicity
of
right
a
constitute
not
did
videotapes
The facts of Astaire provided the Ninth Circuit with an appropriate
place to draw such a line. Use of the film clips in Astaire is
distinguishable from the voice and identity appropriations at issue in
White, Waits, and Midler. Not only did the use of Astaire's persona
consist of actual images of the performer, the use was not directly
associated with the sales of a consumer product. Rather, the film footage
represented the creator's expressive attempt to honor and remember the
talents of Fred Astaire. That such expression occurred in the form of an
educational, or even entertaining, videotape only adds to its First
Amendment value.
The existence of a First Amendment limitation on right of publicity
claims is necessary to restrict the monopolies celebrities and their heirs
possess over the images of cultural icons, as well as to maintain and
encourage the democratic exchange of ideas. Like Mrs. Astaire, the public
feels that Fred Astaire "belongs" to it. Fred Astaire is a cultural icon
because of his contributions to American film and dance. Fortunately for
the public, the court defined the boundaries of the right of publicity when
presented with the opportunity. Such a ruling affirms the well established
notion that celebrities are entitled to publicity rights for commercial uses
and product endorsements, but allows the public to use images of and
references to the personas of celebrities within informational works and

celebrity by protecting all incidents of identity diminishes the public's opportunity to construct
and to circulate diverse views of what the celebrity means to society.").
182. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299.
183. Id. at 1301-04. The term "film" includes pre-recorded videotapes. Id. at 1301-02.
Section 990's statutory exemption is not "limited to 'legitimate historical, fictional, and
biographical accounts of deceased celebrities."' Id.at 1304.
184. Id. at 1302-03.
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entertainment. 185 The Ninth Circuit has proven that the right of publicity
and the First Amendment can co-exist.
Erika Paulsrude*

185. See Madow, supra note 21, at 130:
Our legal order... has divvied up the economic values associated with modem
celebrity, enabling celebrities to capture (and monopolize) some, but not all, of
them. Thus, on the one hand, celebrity personas may be freely appropriated for
what are deemed to be primarily "informational" and "entertainment" purposes.
Except in unusual circumstances, permission need not be obtained, nor payment
made, for use of a celebrity's name or likeness in a news report, novel, play, film,
or biography.
* I would like to thank Professor Jay Dougherty for his insight and helpful suggestions in
the development of this Note. Many thanks to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal for their commitment and encouragement. In particular, I would
like to thank Scott McPhee, Daniel Walanka, and Nancy Grauman for their time, diligence, and
invaluable comments.

